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Abstract 
A vision of universalised human freedom, equality, security and democracy emerged in the 
wake of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, the British Industrial Revolution and 
the French Revolution. This vision, not even approximately practicable at the time, is now well 
within reach. A viable socialist strategy will not be oriented around an encompassing central 
plan, but rather an agenda of human-centred goals – the creation of preconditions for all 
individuals to fully realise their personal capacities and to function as free citizens, exercising 
control individually and collectively, at the workplace and in society. Central to the realisation 
of such a programme will be a focus on the crucial role played by the first years of life in 
shaping human development and in the formation of class hierarchies. 
 
JEL codes: B51, H40, P16 
 
1. Introduction 
A vision of a universalised human freedom, equality, material security and democracy 
emerged in the wake of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, the British Industrial 
Revolution and the French Revolution. This vision was not even approximately realisable at 
the time. The tasks before the overwhelming bulk of humankind continued to involve material 
deprivation and a helplessness when faced with disease and natural disaster, as well as back-
breaking work in agriculture, mining and the incipient manufacturing sector.  
 
Glaring global disparities in material standards of living persist, and we face existential threats 
of annihilation from the continued world-wide presence of weapons of mass destruction as 
 
1 We thank Adam Aboobaker and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.  
2  Kingston University; socialistoptimism.com 
3  University of Massachusetts Amherst and Aalborg University; pskott@econs.umass.edu 
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well as the disruption and possible decimation of human civilisation from human-based 
interference in the earth’s ecology. The necessity to confront these enormous challenges 
must be central to the emerging socialist strategy. But while recognizing the urgency of 
addressing the interlocking problems of global inequality, climate change and weapons of 
mass destruction, it is also clear that many technological and organisational constraints have 
been relaxed greatly. The realisation of the socialist promise of human development and 
freedom is becoming increasingly attainable if false paths, often well-trodden, are avoided 
and successful strategies, often available ‘off the shelf’, are pursued.  
 
Many obstacles remain. The ones to be focused on here are the distortions emerging from 
present-day intellectual discourse. Economic orthodoxy and, upon occasion, advocates of 
progressive reform have led us away from a human-centred approach to the economy and 
society, the path to be followed if the new society is to emerge. The contention here is that 
at least some of the past failures of the socialist programme were linked to inadequacies in 
the underlying conception, and not to poor execution, the opposition of enemies, or bad luck. 
 
The term ‘socialism’ is often used loosely as an all-embracing term to describe a progressive 
agenda. But there exist two prominent conceptualisations of socialism, and they are largely 
orthogonal to each other. The essential socialist goals embodied in the Radical Enlightenment 
principles discussed above may be juxtaposed with a second conceptualisation, an 
identification from René Descartes (also, of course, emerging from the Enlightenment) of 
socialism as a planned, rational approach to economic allocation, to be contrasted with the 
‘anarchy’ of capitalism as its antipode. The two conceptualisations are quite distinct. In the 
jargon of economics, human freedom, equality and democracy represent the targets, while 
central planning came to be seen by many socialists as the inescapable instrument to achieve 
these targets.  
 
We reject this view of central planning as an appropriate focal point of socialist thought. 
Tendencies in the direction of planification can be and often are elite-driven projects 
(frequently focused on an idealised vision of the engineer) that have little to do with the 
aspirations for social equality and democratic control; anti laissez-faire policies of this kind (in 
a corporate state-fascist context, they might well be reactionary) sometimes, misleadingly, 
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acquire the label ‘socialist’. In the peculiar manner that the history of these doctrines has 
unfolded, it is policies associated with the Plan that have often been identified with ‘real’ 
socialism, while activities linked with Radical Enlightenment principles (e.g. expansion in 
access to education) have often been treated as mere exercises in social democracy. 
 
This essay accepts the Radical Enlightening goals of human development, equality, material 
security and democracy. Our focus is on the implications of these goals for a socialist agenda 
of policies and interventions. Some limitations of our analysis should be emphasised at the 
outset, most specifically, the absence of strategies for the formation of the movements and 
organisations needed to fight for the implementation of the socialist agenda. Rather than 
attempt to present a complete strategic perspective, we focus on the articulation of a 
coherent vision of socialist development, an essential concomitant of mobilising support for 
a socialist agenda and ensuring its overall coherence.  
 
A second set of limitations relate to our focus on rich countries. Many issues will look quite 
different from the perspective of a poor country characterised by widespread poverty and 
large amounts of underemployment in subsistence agriculture and informal urban sectors. 
These features do not invalidate the primary focus here on human development, but a range 
of constraints, priorities and policies are likely to differ from those in rich countries.4 The 
commonalities and contrasts between socialist priorities in rich and poor countries is a vast 
issue that must be put to one side here. 
 
Sections 2 discusses traditional socialist views on central-planning and nationalisation of the 
means of production. The Radical Enlightenment vision is presented in greater detail in 
section 3, along with examples of interventions and policies. Section 4 turns to 
macroeconomic policy and its role in a socialist agenda. This section also comments briefly on 
some differences between our perspective and well-known strands of heterodox 
macroeconomics. The concluding section 5 considers the viability of a socialist economy – 
 
4  As pointed out by a referee, there may be important questions of path dependence and the influence of 
political systems on economic development; Sen (1983) offers an interesting perspective on some of these 
issues. 
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were the proposals to be implemented – and the relations of the proposals to trends in 
contemporary capitalism  
 
2. The planning detour 
In the early twentieth century, a more definitive version of the conceptualisation of socialism 
as planning emerged with the notion of the new society having aspects of ‘one big factory’. 
The principles of this Technocratic Planning Paradigm (TPP) were widely recognised across a 
broad spectrum of thinkers that included not only self-identified socialists, but those deemed 
technocrats, Saint-Simonians and a range of incipient corporatists, including proto-fascists.  
 
The first principle of the TPP emerged from an empirical generalisation: there had been an 
inexorable growth in the efficient scale of enterprises and of units of production in modern 
capitalism. This observation gave rise to a notion that the future socialist economy could be 
observed in an incipient form from contemporaneous exemplifications, especially the giant, 
self-contained corporate entities of North America, so that Thomas A. Edison and Henry Ford 
became the unlikely heroes of socialism, their creations the auguries of the future planned 
society. For European socialists, the German economy, closer at hand, was an important focus 
for these attitudes, especially in the context of extravagant claims for the planned, rational 
nature of the First World War German economy.5 Vladimir Lenin declares in 1917, in a fit of 
irrational exuberance, that the post-revolutionary economy can simply be administered by a 
few accountants. (Lenin 1917, pp.119-122).  
 
Second, accompanying the focus on increases in the efficient scale of units of production was 
the inference that the liberal vision of competition between enterprises as a mode of 
regulation for the economy was obsolescent (Steinmetz 1916).6 The word ‘monopoly’ took 
centre stage in the analysis, and socialist variants of TPP integrated the nefarious behaviour 
of giant firms with the ability of the financial sector to disrupt whole economies while 
pursuing what would appear to be casino-like activities. In this context planning was seen as 
 
5 There were a series of articles written in 1915-1916 to this effect by the Bolshevik Yuri Larin published in 
Vestnik Evropy (European Herald); see Auerbach et al. (1988). 
6  This principle was readily accepted by the business class itself as justification for market dominance of 
important sectors of the economy. 
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a mode of regulation for the economy in place of an inoperative or dysfunctional competitive 
mechanism. TPP offered alleviation for periodic and pronounced economic crises (in whose 
observation and conceptualisation Karl Marx had played a pioneering role in the 19th century) 
by proffering a planned, technocratic alternative.  
 
Third, there was a general embrace of an engineering perspective that viewed activities such 
as administration, marketing and, especially finance as peripheral: all were waste, to be 
eliminated in a rational approach to the organisation of economic activity (Veblen 1921).  
 
The TPP as a vision of the future of capitalism was deeply flawed. The notion that capitalism 
in its most mature phase was moving headlong in an administered direction was simply false. 
The conduct of business affairs within enterprises did indeed grow ever more sophisticated 
over the twentieth century, but the resultant effect was not the appearance of a Galbraithian 
New Industrial State (Galbraith, 1967) and a capitalism dominated by monopolistic ‘islands of 
planning’. Rather we observe, by the latter part of the twentieth century, a pronounced loss 
of control by these enterprises over their own destinies engendered by the growth of 
rivalrous competition, most especially in an international context. When the market power of 
these giant enterprises was preserved and, in some cases, increased in recent years, it has 
often been a result of the application of the most ancient of remedies, government patronage 
(e.g. the ‘defence’ industry) or protection, with intellectual property rights [IPRs] now the 
most conspicuous weapon (Sherman 2019, McCormick 2020). 
 
When the TPP vision of capitalism was applied in a post-revolutionary context by Lenin using 
his ‘with a few accountants’ methodology, the results -- the economy of war communism – 
were catastrophic and had to be abandoned for a ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP) that allowed 
market forces to operate. The full-fledged commitment to the planned economy in the Soviet 
Union that followed in the late 1920s is one of the major events of that century, with striking 
and tragic consequences. A full consideration of the manifest failure of state central planning 
in the Soviet Union and other countries in which it was implemented would, of necessity, be 
accompanied by a consideration of a range of historically contingent events, including the 
Second World War, the effects of Cold War inhibitions on trade and technological blockades, 
the burden of Cold War arms expenditure, and the economic, social and political heritages of 
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the countries involved. But the central planning system did not fail merely because it had 
never been done ‘properly’, or because of the wiliness and tenacity of enemies (Kornai 1980).  
 
However, the biggest failure of central planning as a fulcrum around which to build a left 
alternative to capitalism stems from its incapacity to reflect the focus on human-centred 
development and democratic decision-making that must be part of a socialist programme. 
This deficiency was manifest in the substantive unfolding of the operation of centrally planned 
systems across the twentieth century but also reflects a fundamental incompatibility between 
central planning and democratic decision-making. The central planning agenda does not lend 
itself to the fulfilment of aspirations for autonomy and democracy at the level of the 
workplace. Indeed, not only are such conflicts easily imagined, but they in fact constantly 
arose in the context of the history of centrally planned economies. The problems of bringing 
recalcitrant actors in conformity with the dictates of the centre endangers the very vision of 
socialism as human development and freedom. The traditional Trotskyist view was quite to 
the contrary: the failures of central planning, as in the Soviet context, were due to a lack of 
democratic decision-making, which was then reflected in both politics and in economic 
outcomes. But the form of static, top-down democracy that was invariably envisioned 
(Mandel 1986), with the broad base of the population somehow assenting to a General Plan 
on, perhaps, an annual basis, reflects a limited, static view of democracy, one in which, once 
the Plan is in place, few base-level decisions are possible, or desirable. If, indeed, continuous 
democratic ‘interference’ were possible, what is the point of the Plan?  
 
The Leninist notion of running the economy ‘with a few accountants’ represented a 
dangerous and misguided detour founded in large part on a misreading of the trajectory of 
capitalism. But the neoliberal vision also fares poorly. The widespread and, in many cases, 
uncritical reception to a neoliberal vision of economic organisation cannot be supported by 
the economic history of the recent period or economic logic.  
 
Exceptions to the use of pure market mechanisms are acknowledged even by staunch 
supporters of the neoliberal programme. Externalities and collective action problems make it 
necessary to centralise strategic decisions concerning investment in key domains such as 
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basic infrastructure, urban planning, and health.7  But the role of state intervention goes 
beyond these areas. A recent triumph often attributed to the dynamism of free market 
capitalism, the extraordinarily rapid development and maturation of the electronics sector in 
the US after the Second World War, proceeded under the aegis and as a direct result of 
intervention by the US Department of Defense. This act of state involvement in economic 
planning, though taking place in the particular context of Cold War military rivalry, was also 
emblematic of fundamental aspects of free market failure in the context of the dispersion of 
information. Thus, it is unlikely that any individual capitalist enterprise would have been able 
to capture the full value of the basic research involved in this emergent technology, making 
‘underinvestment’ inevitable if the research had been pursued in a purely capitalist context; 
the attempt by AT&T to garner all the gains of its initial discoveries for itself was thwarted 
when the US government forced the company to licence its patents on the new 
semiconductor technology to rivals, an act undoubtedly helping to generate the ferocious 
levels of competition and innovation that became associated with this sector in its 
efflorescent period (Lécuyer 2006, Mazzucato 2013).8  
 
The electronics example illustrates a developmental role of the government policy that has 
gained recognition. But development policies need not be socialist. Nationalisation is not per 
se a socialist measure, and it sometimes proves to be pointless. The example of post-Second 
World War Britain demonstrates that government takeover of sectors of the economy can 
lead nowhere. If, as in the British case, the former owners are fully compensated for the 
takeovers, there is no obvious redistribution of income or wealth; if the ‘new’ management 
of the nationalised enterprises is chosen from the revolving door of existing managers and 
the voice of workers in enterprise decision-making is no greater than before, it is not evident 
that democracy, either for the economy as a whole or within the enterprise, has been 
advanced. Perhaps most significantly, in the absence of a clear set of goals for the nationalised 
 
7 Even Hayek (1960) accepted the need for a governmental role in urban planning; health may not be quite as 
universally accepted, but the experience of the late 19th century was that this most decisive aspect of the 
improvement of the material conditions of the populations of Western Europe and North America under the 
aegis of capitalism resulted from actions on public health, most especially the control of infectious disease, 
which were almost invariably the product of interventions by the state (Fogel, 2004). 
8 In this light, the increasing use by firms of patents (or, more broadly, IPRs) suggests a highly dysfunctional and 
anti-social element in present-day capitalism, by which a constriction in the flow of new information and ideas 
to others may function as a core-level competitive strategy (Boldrin and Levine 2013). 
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enterprises that differed from those associated with the heretofore privately-owned firms, 
their operation and development is likely to be poor, as in the case of nationalisation in Britain 
of such industries as steel, cars and shipbuilding. (Nationalisation for the sake of being 
integrated into a central plan may, or may not have been advisable, but at least, under such 
circumstances, it would have had a coherent purpose.) To make matters worse, these 
nationalised enterprises found their behaviour subject to partisan political considerations, 
with perhaps even less of a tendency to function in the public interest than if they had been 
private firms subject to an independent regulatory relationship of an adversarial nature 
(Chick, 1980). 
 
3. A socialist agenda  
Externalities and collective action problems are ubiquitous in areas that are central to a 
Radical Enlightenment conceptualisation of socialist priorities, with planning and direction of 
the economy in the broadest sense as well as public ownership of sectors of the economy 
playing important roles in the formulation of a socialist alternative. But the Cartesian vision 
of planning and public ownership takes a subordinate and supportive position. It is the Radical 
Enlightenment focus on human development, equality, household security and democracy 
which plays the predominant role.9 
 
a. Human development.  
A primary aspect of a socialist programme is the cultivation of an equal opportunity for self-
realisation and development of personal capacities for all individuals in society, with work 
moving from alienated, quasi-enslaved activity to ‘autonomous, self-realized labour’, in the 
words of the young Marx.10  Human development is the most fundamental of Radical 
Enlightenment constituents of socialism.  
 
9 Our interpretation of the Radical Enlightenment is a rational reconstruction in the manner of Imre Lakatos, 
rather than an historical interpretation, derived from Israel (2001). A referee has suggested affinities between 
Roncaglia’s (2005) distinction between ‘systematic’ and ‘spontaneous order’ Enlightenment thinking and our 
distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘planning’. 
10 Enlightenment thinkers such as the Marquis de Condorcet and Wilhelm von Humboldt emphasised the 
importance of early childhood for human development. Pioneering work from Mary Wollstonecraft from the 
end of the eighteenth century opposed Jean Jacques Rousseau’s assignation of gender roles from the youngest 
ages and advanced the centrality of education in the cultivation of self-governance for all individuals 
(Mackenzie, 2016). In the twentieth century, we see in Dewey (1915) one of the rare attempts to focus 
explicitly on education from the earliest years in the context of the formation of free individuals and societal 
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Both economic analysis and much public debate have been heavily focused on a very narrow 
conception of human attainment: the need to acquire skills in order to increase economic 
productivity and income. In the theory of human capital -- originally formulated purely from 
an empirical perspective but then elevated by Gary Becker to having theoretical and 
ideological status (Becker, 1962) -- rational individuals choose whether to enhance their levels 
of human capital by investing in formal education. For Becker and the bulk of the human 
capital literature, the theory emerges as one of utility maximising adults making choices about 
investing in themselves and their children.  
 
Exogenously determined utility functions represent a notion of human personality and its 
capacity that has ancient origins in the Augustinian idea of a pre-existent soul. This approach 
developed within the economics of the 19th century into a view of human behaviour as the 
actions of a self-determined, choice-making (male) individual. This very structure of received 
economic theory makes it difficult to approach what should be a central question in the social 
sciences: how are individual personalities in society – their attitudes, as well as their 
repertoire of skills and intellectual capacity – shaped by societal decisions past and present? 
 
In the absence of this fundamental dimension of human development, the productive gains 
to society of any enhancement in its ‘stock of human capital’ are postulated to register 
primarily, and sometimes solely, as (financial) gains to individuals – increases in their future 
stream of income from this investment.11  But education has a role that goes far beyond the 
 
reform. The most significant intervention in this direction in contemporary economic thinking may be found in 
Sen (1999). He rejects the widely accepted neoliberal dichotomy originally found in Isaiah Berlin (1969) 
between two concepts of liberty, a negative one (e.g. freedom from censorship) and a positive aspect (e.g. 
literacy campaigns), in which the latter is usually consigned a lesser status as libertarian virtue. For Sen, by 
contrast, the freedom and development of human beings are rather seen to advance in tandem, with the 
individual enablement emerging from education acting to ratify the absence of censorship. 
11 This last presumption is a very peculiar one. It would appear that nothing is more decisive to the hegemonic 
dominance of the species homo sapiens than its acquisition (if that is the word) of language. But this 
enhancement in the ‘stock of human capital’ is quintessentially a development pervaded with positive 
spillovers – one in which the gains to the species as a whole vastly exceed the gains to any one individual. 
Language facilitates the dispersion of skills and the inter-generational transmission of acquired knowledge, and 
promotes the development of strategic conceptions as well as complex mutual interactions in the form of 
teamwork (Auerbach, 2016, Chapter 7). The effects of spillovers – from investment in human capital as well as 
from learning by doing or the public goods character of knowledge – have been recognized in endogenous 
growth theory as well as in traditional theories of economic development. But the role of learning and its 
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production of marketable skills. Yet, for the great mass of children in most countries, what 
passes for education continues to be the dreary, brutal, post-Industrial Revolution factory-
like activity it has always been with, if anything, an intensified focus on examination results 
and the (near-) exclusion of supposedly peripheral activities such as musical studies, history 
and, in the English-speaking world, foreign languages. The focus on skill acquisition has 
marginalised these more broad-based attainments and, at least implicitly, has led to a 
denigration of the role of education in preparing individuals to be citizens in a democratic 
polity. The one group that in recent years has focused on the elevation of the quality of 
childhood education has been the elite, with the most prestigious private schools putting a 
renewed focus on intellectual attainment, creative endeavour and broad-based facility for 
assimilating world culture, including the arts and foreign languages (Edemariam, 2013; 
Powell, 1996). The bifurcation of society that is manifest in the increasing levels of income 
inequality that have emerged in recent decades appears to be complemented by an 
equivalent growth in the gap between classes in society in the acquisition of an intellectual 
repertoire and accoutrements of world culture. Inequality thus becomes a self-fulfilling 
justification in a meritocratic discourse – as anticipated in the classic book by Michael Young 
(Young, 1963) and more recently in Sandel (2020). 
 
Children’s opportunities for developing their capacities depend on their environment, and 
formal education, including pre-school facilities as well as pre and post-natal care, are the 
most direct and immediate public policy intervention. But a socialist approach must abandon 
the narrow and purely instrumentalist view of education as skill acquisition in preparation for 
‘productive jobs’; an overly tight linking of skill acquisition to the present needs of employers 
would, in any case, be a fool’s errand in the context of rapidly changing demands for skills in 
a working context, with such demands better met by broad-based skill development – 
education - of the population. More significantly, much of what is most precious in a culture 
emerges and flourishes from little-understood social movements (e.g. the development of 
jazz in the US in the twentieth century), rather than from the activities of even the most well-
intentioned of social planners. The goal of social policy must therefore be to offer 
 
spillovers in this literature is purely instrumental: it raises productivity and economic growth (e.g. Lucas 1988, 
Romer 1990). 
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opportunities for individuals and groups in society to develop and originate their own creative 
capacities (e.g. through the provision of tuition on musical instruments at school), rather than 
attempting to impose an approved set of paths. 
 
Let us dwell slightly longer on the contradictions of consumerism. The psychoanalyst Erich 
Fromm (1976) counterpoised life-enhancing human activity with goods consumption - was 
civilisation indeed advanced when the piano was replaced in the bourgeois household by the 
gramophone? The issue is a complicated one. We may use the example of the extraordinary 
mid-twentieth century jazz pianist Art Tatum, the product of a working class African 
American, rather than a bourgeois household. The details are murky, but he appears to have 
had access to a piano at a young age, fostering his prodigious talent (Lester 1995). The avant 
garde of the jazz piano world was in New York, whose ragtime competitors ‘from the sticks’ 
were looked down upon by the New Yorkers. But Tatum was from Toledo, Ohio, and yet 
emerged as the supreme musician, having mastered the most advanced techniques and 
tendencies by hearing them on radio and gramophone. In drawing lessons here, perhaps an 
imperfect analogy is apposite: the health of a child can be damaged by over-use of technology 
– by being driven everywhere in a car instead of walking, running or bicycling – but, for a 
range of people, access to exercise machines may be useful when other opportunities are 
excluded. The conclusions to be drawn are that technology, thoughtlessly used (people, and 
especially children, getting in the habit of listening to the radio and gramophone, rather than 
going through the arduous task of mastering a music instrument) can destroy the living, active 
aspect of a culture, of individuals being and participating in it; at the same time, these 
technologies can enrich and disseminate culture in ways unprecedented in the past. This 
being culture is more alive, vibrant and sustainable than one built on having.  
 
Last but not least, the general education system has a fundamental responsibility to prepare 
students to participate actively in democratic processes. But human development does not 
end at age 25, and flexible access to free adult education, both vocational and nonvocational, 
can play a role in enhancing human freedom, permitting individuals to change direction 
vocationally and to cultivate new fields of activity – intellectual, artistic and athletic. Such 
access could be combined with a right for everyone to periodic leave with full or partial pay. 
Less radically, a way to combat the dispersion of pseudo-science and pseudo-history is the 
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underwriting through public funding of high-quality programmes with broad appeal (e.g. the 
science programmes produced by PBS in the US), which may serve as a base-line of quality 
and accuracy for a broad range of offerings. 
 
Battles over education in the form of knowledge acquisition, but as well over preparation to 
function as a free citizen at work, in society and vis-à-vis governing bodies are fundamental 
and must be confronted directly unless we simply postulate that personality formation 
emerges in the form of exogenous utility functions. A primary goal of an educational 
programme should be to attempt to compensate for differences in household resources and 
impart to all children the opportunity to acquire the behavioural, intellectual, and even 
physical repertoire typically bestowed on young children from elite backgrounds. Any serious 
attempt at a programme of this kind would involve an enormous resource commitment, one 
greater than that devoted to the pointless project of landing a person on the moon in 1969, 
or even the murderous enterprise of the annual manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. 
There are regular reports in the public media surrounding the chasms in the acquisition of 
this repertoire from children of different classes that emerge in the first years of life, (e.g. 
Michnick Golinkoff et al. 2018; Feldman 2019), but they are given the kind of attention 
accorded to the discovery of a new moon on a distant planet, rather than a central factor 
shaping the future of human civilisation.  
 
b. Equality and household security 
Policy cannot be restricted to formal education and childcare. The primary social factor 
impinging upon a child’s development is the household environment which embraces the 
behavioural and intellectual characteristics of those raising the child (parents or care givers), 
the physical characteristics of the dwelling, the provision of food and amenities, and 
neighbourhood characteristics, including physical safety, sanitary and environmental 
conditions and the presence of public amenities such as public transport. No simple remedies 
will deal with all the elements. A set of complementary policies will be called upon, including 
free and universal health care, affordable housing and high-quality childcare, child benefits, 
and paid sick and family leave.  
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Broader issues surrounding household security, including those affecting primarily the lives 
of the parents or carers, also impinge upon the life of the child, such as continuity and 
regularity of work conditions and a decent income. A strengthening of unions, labour market 
legislation, and health and safety regulation clearly come into play here.12 Economic security 
plays a vital role in planning for the development of the human assets of the household, an 
issue skirted over even in the human capital variants of economic orthodoxy. Eliding the 
distinction between necessities and luxuries, remuneration is often conceptualised as an issue 
that is – for all groups, rich and poor – about incentives. At the low end of the income 
spectrum, however, a shortfall in income can result, not in an ‘incentive’ of one kind or 
another but, by cutting into the consumption of necessities, reduce the household’s capacity 
to function – to preserve and develop the human assets of its members (Gough 1991).  
 
The link between income inequality, more especially the presence of poverty, and the child’s 
upbringing is straightforward, but note the substantial number of factors other than income 
needed to evaluate the environment in which a child develops: a child growing up in a low-
income family in Tokyo is likely to be faced with substantially lower levels of neighbourhood 
violence than one in New York City. Notions of economic and social equality are far from being 
adequately described by statistics on the distribution of income and wealth, however useful 
they may be. To rely on such statistics exclusively also precludes consideration of aspects of 
inequality linked to the presence of social hierarchies -- including class differences and gender 
and racial discrimination – as well as asymmetries in access to information and the more 
subtle aspects of social mobility, as embodied, for instance, in the self-confidence and class 
cohesiveness imbued in those ‘born to rule’ in British private schools (Kynaston and Green, 
2019). 
 
With human personality and capacity itself contingently shaped by levels of social and 
economic equality, distinctions between ‘equality of opportunities’ and ‘equality of 
outcomes’ become blurred (Phillips 2004); highly unequal outcomes are incompatible with 
equality of opportunity. Traditional welfare analysis is also affected. The notion of 
preferences and utility functions as the foundation for analysing human behaviour and 
 
12  EPI (2018) presents a concrete list of reforms in a US context. 
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welfare can no longer be justified on the basis of the scientific principle of simplicity (if care 
is not taken, one can slit one’s throat with Occam’s Razor). Thus, when considering ‘theories 
of justice’, the main consideration, we are told, is whether the distribution of income in 
society is ‘fair’ (Rawls, 1999). But once the child, rather than the adult, enters as a 
representative human being, the distribution of resources in society impinges upon the 
formation of the human personality itself. Equality ceases to be a parameter easily 
summarised in simple statistics and instead embodies the very context in which a human 
personality and its intellectual and behavioural repertoire are formed (Auerbach 2016, 
Chapter 10). 
 
c. Democracy.  
Under capitalism the workplace is governed by a work relation that contains the ‘capitalist as 
chief, and work-people without a voice in the management’ (Mill, 1870). The principle of 
democracy in the socialist tradition, by contrast, evokes a notion of popular control that 
moves beyond periodic voting to various aspects of daily life, and most especially to 
democratic control in the workplace. Cooperative enterprises to replace capitalist ones have 
had only limited success in advancing democratic control, however. In no economy have they 
become predominant, and while important instances of cooperative and team-organised 
activities in manufacturing and services have existed and sometimes flourished, they have 
done so primarily by adhering to norms set by capitalist-dominated markets (Alperovitz 
2013). 
 
Even if the external workings of a cooperative enterprise may be largely dictated by market-
based norms, the enhancement of democratic control in the day-by-day workings of the 
enterprise is worth pursuing. But worker control of an enterprise is not achieved by an act of 
legislation on the path to socialism – it is part of a reconfiguration of human relations both 
within the enterprise, and external to it. Human development is an essential part of this 
process. The need to provide every individual with the preparation from the earliest years to 
function as a free citizen – to exercise control, individually and collectively, at the workplace 
and in society, is particularly relevant for women, minorities, and individuals from lower 
income and deprived groups, if ordained rights are not to be merely pro forma.  
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A prominent academic literature depicts the firm as a voluntary interaction of a team. The 
central agent (the capitalist) typically hires workers to perform tasks, but it might just as well 
have been the other way around - workers could have hired a capitalist, whose specialised 
skills would facilitate team production: ‘[In] the classical firm… the central agent is called the 
firm's owner and the employer. No authoritarian control is involved. The contractual structure 
arises as a means of enhancing efficient organization of team production’ (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972). Let us, for the sake of argument, put to one side the fanciful notion that 
ownership qua ownership is of no consequence and that workers, acting collectively, could 
well have, in this world of a perfect capital market, hired a capitalist as manager to run the 
enterprise. What remains is the valid point that, even putting to one side Marxian notions of 
capitalist exploitation on the basis of ownership, an individual, whether dubbed agent or 
manager, may gain an exceptional level of remuneration and the ability to exercise 
disproportionate influence over the mass of workers due to his or her possession of 
specialised skills.  
 
An historical illustration may be useful. In the process of forced collectivisation of agriculture 
in the USSR in the late 1920s, the key slogan from the state was the ‘liquidation of the kulaks 
(rich peasants) as a class’. And yet decades later, Soviet authorities continued to evince 
unease about the pervasive influence in the collective farms of these very same kulaks. Their 
possession of technical and managerial skills, as well as the social networks necessary for the 
procurement of inputs (seed, etc.) for farm production and, perhaps, the presence of a 
residual level of deference from the poorer peasants, dictated that the tendency for these 
former kulaks to emerge as, at very least, de facto collective farm leaders. Even murderous 
exertion from the state, it seems was not sufficient to dismember the class hierarchies 
present in agricultural production (Fitzpatrick 1994). It is for this reason that we emphasise 
that even highly desirable interventions that promote democratisation of the workplace 
(Devine, 2010) must be complemented by a ‘cultural revolution’ that minimises any gap in 
skills between management and worker and enhances the capacity for self-rule on the part 
of the latter.   
 
Capitalists find it more difficult to exercise control in situations in which their managerial 
advantages are minimised, so that, historically, labour unions of skilled workers across many 
 16 
countries, most especially in sectors such as shipbuilding with a high degree of self-
organisation, posed the greatest challenges to capitalist dominance. Within the enterprise, 
the presence of high skills in the workforce can facilitate the assimilation of information about 
the functioning of the enterprise and its monitoring; it can even make the presence of 
management look redundant. And capitalists have often made strenuous efforts to 
reorganise the work process to thwart the continuance and development of forms of worker 
self-organisation (Braverman 1988).  
 
The de jure power of labour becomes important, however, in this contestation between 
labour and capital. In Germany, even the feeble levels of influence given to organised labour 
in corporate decision-making in the process of co-determination have led to a situation in 
which Germany's employment ministry (under a Christian Democratic government) has 
banned its managers from calling or emailing staff out of hours – a development unthinkable 
in the US under any political administration.13 The forms of worker representation in 
corporate decision-making have had limited overall impact but, as illustrated here in the case 
of Germany, can yield some promising developments on, at very least the peripheral aspects 
of working life.14  
 
The power of the working class vis-à-vis capital is most importantly dictated by the level of 
labour union organisation, in which de jure legitimation and constraints play a key role; the 
dramatic decline of unionisation in the US can be explained in large part by legal changes that 
undercut the ability of workers to organize and bargain (Rhinehart et al. 2020). In this regard, 
it is definitive that the Samuel Gompers strategy for US labour unions at the beginning of the 
twentieth century – that they should pursue purely economic goals at the level of the 
individual union and abjure broad political strategies and involvement – was, in the longer 
term, an abject failure, the post-Second World War period seeing a precipitous decline in the 
gains made by unions in the New Deal period, much of this brought about, or at least 
 
13  The ministry ‘is following the lead of major German companies such as automaker Volkswagen and 
Deutsche Telekom’ with ‘official guidelines stating that no staff should be penalized for turning off their 
cellphone or failing to pick up messages after working hours "to prevent self-exploitation"’ (Reason, 2013).  A 
brief description of the German system of co-determination can be found at Deutschland.de (2013) 
14 Labour unions pushed more radical proposals for economic democracy in the Nordic countries in the 1970s 
but were met by fierce resistance; in Denmark the labour movement had largely abandoned these plans by the 
mid-1980s. 
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accelerated by anti-union legislation. The US is now the bellwether for a link between income 
inequality and labour union weakness (Jaumotte and Buitron 2015) and registers hours 
worked per year at a level that is, astoundingly, 26 per cent greater than an average of 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden (OECD 2019). It is not only, however, 
in these concrete economic outcomes that we observe the failed Samuel Gompers strategy. 
Such an approach, besides negating the important, and inevitable role of labour unions in 
politics and public policy (Ahlquist 2017) fails as well in neglecting the important role of 
unions, one well-established already in the nineteenth century, of serving as a source of 
information and perspectives that is independent, and apart from, the corporate owned and 
dominated sources of mass culture (Macdonald 2019). 
 
A dearth of reliable information in the public sphere can be a major obstacle to democracy, 
both at the firm level and at the level of society as a whole. Basic facts about, for instance, 
the distribution of economic rewards in society are often buried in a miasma of 
misinformation and confusion. Governments often attempt to repress information that might 
be embarrassing if publicly disclosed, but in the absence of tenuous national security 
justifications, such suppression is seen as blatantly self-serving. By contrast, a rich Lockean 
philosophical heritage has linked the existence of private property to liberty and a 
concomitant repression of information from the public domain, which has encouraged a 
culture in which the ‘default setting’ is the repression of information, even in the case of a 
large corporation. Other approaches are, however, possible. Following up on a tradition 
emerging since the 19th century, all Norwegian tax records since 2001 have become easily 
accessible online, a fact that has had interesting and curious cultural side-effects, (Perez-
Truglia, 2020) but whose longer term political and social ramifications - and possibilities - are 
barely discernible  
 
It would be no less desirable to match the transparency manifest by public disclosure on levels 
of income and wealth of individuals with the institution of a similar level of disclosure 
concerning the manner in which business enterprises function, including the procedures they 
use for the making of business decisions and for the setting of remuneration standards. Such 
changes would be of both symbolic and substantive significance. At a symbolic level, high 
levels of public scrutiny for enterprises, especially larger ones, would challenge the Lockean 
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notion that, for instance, an enterprise decision to shift its production overseas is a matter of 
the disposition of private property, and no more a question for public inquiry than how an 
individual re-arranges the furniture in her dwelling. 
 
Developments of this kind that impinge upon the inviolability of private property would not 
be unprecedented. Governmental restriction on the freedom of, especially, large enterprises 
to do what they please emerged in the US in the late 19th century with the passage of the first 
antitrust legislation and laws enforcing food and drug purity; enterprises that sell shares to 
the public found themselves progressively subject to enforced public disclosure of basic 
accounting information over the twentieth century. Enterprises had often withheld such 
information, claiming that material of value would be revealed to competitors, but legally 
enforced universal (within a nation) disclosure largely neutralised this excuse. The adaptation 
of legally enforced disclosure came about because the owners of enterprise shares – a small 
group in society of wealthy individuals – were often favourably disposed to this form of 
regulation, hoping it would function as a mechanism for the monitoring of the managers who 
directed large enterprises with increasing independence from shareholders. Few of these 
regulatory developments concerning public disclosure of accounting information, however, 
were of any benefit to the other stakeholders in the enterprise – its workers, customers and 
suppliers. The promotion of a legislative framework that puts a spotlight on the public’s right 
to know how the activities and decision-making procedures of enterprises are carried out 
would be complementary to an extension of labour union power and the worker 
representation on the corporate boards. Having the details of the functioning of the 
enterprise open to public scrutiny, including details of working conditions, would be a 
prerequisite to asking fundamental questions about its public role and public responsibilities.  
 
In dealing with democracy, this last on the list of Radical Enlightenment constituents of 
socialism, we have focused on democratic control of the place of work as an aspect that is 
typically thrust to one side in conventional discussions of democracy.  Workplace democracy 
at the enterprise level does not simply scale up at the societal level, even if we consider only 
economic decisions like production, work organisation, and pay. An enterprise controlled 
democratically by its workers still has to exist in a social context, in a relationship to the 
economy as a whole.  
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One aspect concerns the distribution of income. Democratic decisions at the firm level do not 
address inequality across firms, and economy-wide distributional conflicts will not magically 
disappear with the first socialist reforms. Individual cooperative enterprises could easily find 
themselves in a ‘war against all’, with some benefiting from the ability to exploit monopoly or 
differential rent advantage. A particular concern in recent times has been the role of 
corporate giants as gatekeepers of information and the pernicious influence of social media 
and Big Money in the decimation of democratic processes, a development most striking in 
the US, but manifest elsewhere. Tackling these problems represents an urgent challenge for 
any progressive movement, and socialists weaned on the prospects for a centrally-planned 
economy may have to re-learn lessons from the twentieth century concerning anti-
monopolies policies and the control of Big Money in politics (Teachout 2020). But questions 
surrounding the regulation of enterprise performance from a societal perspective will 
continue to obtrude, even in a world of cooperative enterprises and widespread workplace 
democracy. Economy-wide post-tax inequality will be affected by the structure of taxation 
and public spending; progressive income, wealth and estate taxes and a strong social safety 
net are obvious examples on the tax/transfer side, while public spending on childcare and 
education exemplifies the spending side. Pre-tax incomes can be influenced by regulation of 
goods and labour markets. Strong labour unions can help manufacture consensus on what 
constitutes a fair wage structure, as exemplified by ‘solidaristic wage policies’ that compress 
income disparities (Schulten, 2002).15 
 
The limitations of workplace democracy as the locus of decision making on production and 
pay shows up in other areas. Democratic firms, like their traditional counterparts, have no 
incentive (and often insufficient information) to consider externalities. The emerging 
ecological crises, the most pressing of which is concerned with global heating, is the obvious 
example. Centrally imposed regulation as well as Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are needed to 
address these externalities. Carbon taxes, for instance, can speed up a green transition, and 
congestion charges can alleviate urban congestion and improve air quality. These 
 
15 Centralised unions have also acted as a moderating influence on nominal wage demands and inflation. They 
often recognise that raising all nominal wages may generate a significant rise in consumer prices with little or 
no improvement in real wages (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) 
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interventions typically have distributional effects, and it is encouraging to note that the Green 
New Deal in the US and policy proposals from Green parties across the world have increasingly 
taken these distributional effects seriously, a major achievement in the context of the origins 
of the ecological movement in elite groupings and self-righteous rhetoric (Carey, 1992). 
 
Policy choices, finally, must be made with respect the role of finance and the financial sector. 
Once a central planning approach based upon the TPP is dismissed, the convenient left-wing 
stance suggesting that finance is an inherently predatory activity does not solve the question 
of how investment funds are to be allocated. One element of reform will be a new culture of 
the free dispersion of information, permitting the public to make inquiries on how decisions 
are made concerning the allocation of financial resources. In such an information-rich 
environment, market-based financial allocation (stock and bond markets, etc.) may no longer 
offer advantages to society of a broader dispersion of information compared with financial 
institutions, so that the lethal destabilising effects of financial markets at the macroeconomic 
level can be mitigated by reducing their prominence in economic allocation. Transparency 
has, in fact, been moving in a retrograde direction in the US in the past several decades, with 
a permissive attitude to antitrust and the emergence of giant financial entities that serve their 
own needs and those of their owners, under the dubious presumption that some invisible 
hand aligns their actions with the public good.16 But transparency clearly is not sufficient. 
Other reforms will be likely to involve breaking up financial giants, enhanced regulation of 
financial practices and institutions, and Tobin taxes. Public financial entities could also be 
created (possibly through nationalisation) to finance priority areas in which externalities 
make private investment socially desirable but unprofitable at market rates of interest. 
Investments with strong environmental benefits represent obvious examples, but 
externalities affect multiple aspects of human development, and a human-based approach to 
finance will put a higher weight on policies that promote a stable economic environment and 
economic security to households, even at the cost of a superficial economic dynamism.  
 
16 In the US especially, such has been the revolving door between regulators of the financial sector and those 
involved in its governance that, perhaps even in the context of some imagined nationalisation of leading 
financial institutions, there are few individuals left to direct these entities who might possess the experience 
and institutional knowledge needed to re-orient the financial sector in the direction of projects with a public 
purpose. A reconstitution of a culture of public service among individuals engaged in regulating the financial 
sector may be a prerequisite to it functioning in a manner conducive to human needs. 
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4. Macroeconomic policy 
Having rejected the TPP approach and left significant space for decentralised decision making, 
a mechanism for macroeconomic stabilisation must be found. The maintenance of full 
employment falls to some form of Keynesian policy – a set of instruments unavailable to 
socialists in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
Business cycles are dampened by automatic fiscal stabilizers, and these are inevitably 
strengthened by an enhanced role of government in key investment decisions as well as by 
improvements in the social safety net. Formalized employer-of-last-resort programmes can 
play a role as automatic stabilisers as well, but a combination of generous unemployment 
benefits and active labour market policies may be preferable; in fact, the lines between 
employer of last resort programmes and active labour market policies become blurred if the 
active policies include government provided or subsidised jobs, as is the case in some 
countries.17 Discretionary policy can and should be used to complement the automatic 
stabilisers. 
 
In principle, a socialist economy could also face ‘structural aggregate demand problems’ or 
‘secular stagnation’. An economy with a low growth rate of potential output – low population 
growth and low rates of technical change – does not need to expand its capital stock at a fast 
rate. Investment will tend to be low, and the economy faces a structural aggregate demand 
problem if the private saving rate is high. The Japanese economy after 1990 is emblematic of 
this scenario (Nakatani and Skott 2007). Sustained fiscal stimulus can be used address this 
problem and maintain full employment.18 The interventions can be structured to stimulate 
consumption or, alternatively to create incentives for reduced working hours – extended 
parental leave, improved early retirement options or increases in paid vacation, for instance.  
 
 
17  Wray (2011) are among the advocates of employer of last resort, while Sawyer (2003) and Palley (2020) 
present critiques. Heinesen et al. (2013) provide a brief description of active labour market polices in Denmark 
and estimate their effects for immigrants receiving social assistance. See Card et al. (2010) for a meta-analysis 
of active labour market policies. 
18 Abba Lerner (1943) laid out the basic argument for what he labeled functional finance, that is, the use of 
fiscal and monetary policy to maintain full employment and a desirable level of investment; Ryoo and Skott 
(2013 and Skott (2016) discuss dynamic implications for public debt and the sustainability of the policy. 
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Issues of aggregate demand have figured prominently in heterodox macroeconomics, and it 
may be useful to relate our sketch of the role of macroeconomic policy to two strands of the 
literature. One strand has promoted ‘wage-led growth’ (e.g. Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013), 
arguing that an increase in the wage share would raise the rate of economic growth in most 
economies. Notions of wage-led growth have obvious political appeal. A convergence 
between progressive policies on income inequality and macroeconomic expansion implies 
that redistributive policies become desirable from the perspective of the most widely used 
criterion for good performance. But the issue of the true target of policy – is it GDP growth or 
a more egalitarian society? – becomes muddled in the process.  
 
Clarity and precision concerning the targets to be pursued are vital: strategies of egalitarian 
human development compared with rapid economic growth – even if positively correlated – 
will not be identical and may dictate different, or even opposing, specific policies. Historically, 
for instance, car production has contributed to economic success as measured by GDP. From 
a human-based perspective, what we are largely consuming is not the physical object – the 
car – but the ability, for instance, to move through a city quickly. Yet, for many decades, 
journey times have not been falling (to understate the case) as car production and 
consumption have increased. We have examples, however, of how congestion charges and 
more thoughtful organisation of cities can complement improved public transport. Measured 
GDP may not increase, and could even fall, but the result can be faster journeys, less pressure 
on resource use and improved air quality. Urban planning with networks of bicycle paths and 
walkways as well as safe local public parks, playgrounds and sports facilities lower levels of 
childhood inequality and also increase children’s ability to move about independently rather 
than depend on adults, most especially in contexts where the lowering of living density to 
accommodate cars is mitigated. 
 
It would still be a cause for concern if a socialist agenda had large and unforeseen effects on 
economic growth as conventionally measured, if only in a polemical context. But the literature 
on wage-led growth focuses narrowly on aggregate demand, and the pure demand effects of 
changes in distribution are largely irrelevant -- not because income distribution does not 
influence aggregate demand or because aggregate demand cannot affect economic growth, 
but because there are other ways to influence aggregate demand. If a more equal distribution 
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of income were to reduce aggregate demand, then surely this particular problem should not 
be seen as a substantial impediment to egalitarian policies. The demand effects of 
redistribution, whether positive or negative, can be offset by adjustments to aggregate 
demand policy, as argued above (see Appendix A for a simple formalisation of the argument). 
In short, a socialist agenda that involves progressive redistribution could have adverse effects 
on economic growth through other channels (we return to this issue in the next section), but 
the potential effects on aggregate demand are of little or no importance.19  
 
Another strand of contemporary heterodox economic writing, Modern Monetary Theory 
(MMT), is not inherently left wing but has become popular in left-wing circles frustrated by 
political obstacles to greater governmental expenditure on social programmes. In its most 
extreme versions, it suggests that all socially desirable programmes can be done as a ‘free 
lunch’. Kelton (2019), for instance, recommends that ‘we simply invest in programs to benefit 
the non-rich (student-debt forgiveness, free child care and so on) without treating the rich as 
our piggy bank’ since this option ‘is clearly better for both groups’. In a similar vein, Tcherneva 
(2019) argues that the left can ‘render the wealthy obsolete — as in, we will stop pretending 
that we need them to pay for the good society. In a world with a sovereign currency and 
modern monetary and fiscal institutions, we never really did, and we sure don’t now. And the 
public needs to know it. That’s the MMT message.’ By suggesting that taxes on the rich may 
be needed, lefties, she suggests, are ‘tethered to the wealthy by an imaginary umbilical cord’, 
holding their ‘progressive agenda hostage’ to their oppressors. This argument assigns no 
significance per se to the distribution of income and its influence on power relations but 
leaving aside this issue, any ambitious programme to tackle the disadvantages that confront 
children from low- and middle-income households is likely to come up against supply-side 
constraints, even in affluent societies. The constraints are tightened by the need to address 
urgent environmental problems, including climate change. The neglect or dismissal of supply-
side constraints becomes especially dangerous in developing economies. These economies 
face capital and balance of payments constraints (rather than labour constraints), and it is an 
illusion to believe that sustainable improvements for low-income groups can be achieved in 
these economies without sacrificing investment and long-run growth unless there is a 
 
19 Skott (2017) discusses this and other weaknesses of the wage-led growth literature. 
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significant curtailment of luxury consumption by the rich (Aboobaker and Ugurlu 2020, Skott 
2021, Martins and Skott 2021). 
 
Both MMT and the wage-led growth literature ignore or strongly play down supply-side 
constraints and focus on aggregate demand. But whereas the wage-led growth literature 
ignores the fact that aggregate demand problems can be addressed using economic policy, 
MMT denies the relevance of the distributional struggle and promotes exaggerated beliefs in 
the ability of government to satisfy all needs and desires.  
 
5. Has socialism already won (intellectually)? 
The technological and organisational constraints on the realisation of the nineteenth century 
vision of a socialist future have been relaxed greatly. But an even stronger statement is 
possible. The socialist alternative unifies its various aspects around the human-centred 
Radical Enlightenment principles outlined above, and a focus on human development is in the 
present-day not only viable, but one that goes ‘with the grain’ of economic evolution.  
 
It is straightforward to suggest that, at the level of well-being, the case is closed: whether 
looking at ‘hard’, objective indices surrounding longevity and health, or more subjective ones 
concerning trust, conflict and general happiness, the great successes are the social democratic 
nations that have taken on aspects of the Radical Enlightenment programme (ONS, 2019). 
The US, for decades having moved in the direction of increasing inequality, has maintained its 
high ranking in per capita GDP, but in a whole range of other parameters from the provision 
of medical care to levels of educational attainment and even longevity, has functioned, in 
comparison to other high-income countries, at a poor or mediocre level (OECD 2020). It may 
also be noted that the US, touted for much of the twentieth century as the ‘land of 
opportunity’, is now ranked below most other OECD countries in calculations of levels of 
social mobility (Corak 2013; World Economic Forum 2020). Such a finding should be 
unsurprising in the context of the exceptional gaps in access to living conditions and material 
resources that children from different social and economic backgrounds in the US face (Save 
the Children 2020), underlining the absurdity of slogans advocating ‘equality of opportunity’ 
without the need to consider ‘equality of outcomes’. 
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Traditional criteria of economic success will not, however, soon disappear. The growth of GDP 
and ‘economic efficiency’ should not, of course, be our targets, but a socialist programme 
would be doomed if, for instance, policy interventions were perceived to destroy the 
incentives to engage in productive activity, as envisaged by right-wing commentators in the 
USA who have likened Denmark to failed states like Venezuela (Krugman 2018). In fact, social 
democracies such as the Nordic countries perform well (better than the US) in measures of 
median income levels and labour force participation, despite low pecuniary incentives to work 
(Kleven 2014; Phelps and Crabtree 2013). These outcomes may seem surprising from the 
perspective of neoliberal ideology and many traditional economic models. Participation rates 
are high, however, partly because of strong complementarities between women’s 
participation rates and welfare state provisions like childcare and generous maternity leave. 
The depiction of work as necessarily associated with disutility also fails to recognize that work 
can be an important source of well-being, especially if jobs are secure and workers have 
influence on the organization of the workplace, and that unemployment is a source of misery 
(Wood and Burchell 2018).  
 
Productivity also benefits from an emphasis on human development. In the perspicacious, if 
premature words of a contemporary of Marx, Dr Lyon Playfair: ‘Raw material...is being made 
available to all...and industry must in future be supported, not by a competition of local 
advantages, but by a competition of intellects’ (Playfair, 1852). In the late 19th century, doubts 
concerning this proposition were reinforced by the vast amounts of seemingly 
undifferentiated (i.e. ‘unskilled’) labour that continued to be used as fodder for farms and 
factories in all countries, rich and poor, doubts that were reinforced by the persistence, in this 
period, of poor countries - Sweden, Finland, Japan – that were highly literate. All of these 
countries, and others like them, have now emerged as rich, so that formal education is now 
universally viewed as the royal road to economic development (Easterlin, 1981).  
 
Thus, components of a socialist strategy emphasised here, such as formal education, are 
aspects – even the clichés - of mainstream strategies for economic growth success, though 
mainstream versions  will put less emphasis on or, more likely, will omit the roles of, equality 
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and household security.20  These contemporary tendencies can give the illusion that we are 
already moving along a socialist path. A growth oriented educational programme, however, 
will be directed at the passing on of employment-related skills, rather than ‘wasting time’ on 
communicating an understanding, and a love for, the human cultural heritage, including the 
arts and literature, but also science, mathematics and logical discourse, as well as other 
aspects (e.g. a knowledge of history) necessary for citizenship and the exercise of democratic 
control.  
 
Current tendencies in the direction of the weakening of laissez faire through planning and a 
pullback from doctrines of unfettered free trade, likewise, will not necessarily be a path to 
socialist liberation. Using the exemplification given above, the emergence of the revolution 
in electronics that took place in the US after the Second World War was almost totally 
dedicated to the production of weapons of death. This example points to more general issues. 
A focus on economic growth is likely to be complemented with a further set of false contests 
concerning productivity and competitiveness, as each nation considers the threat that others 
represent, economically and otherwise. Thus, despite the (partial) compatibility between the 
trajectory of a Radical Enlightenment-based socialism and more conventional goals attached 
to growth in GDP, there are real dangers in hooking the socialist wagon to such a star.  
 
A progressive programme must proceed along a path that avoids both utopianism, on the one 
hand, and a pragmatism that dispenses with core principles, on the other. Socialist strategies, 
if they are to be taken seriously, cannot be perceived as having been picked out of the air, de 
novo, in an arbitrary, speculative manner. The followers of the TPP in the first part of the 
twentieth century were mistaken, but they were basing their strategy for socialist 
development on what they had perceived was the nature of the development of ‘real existing 
capitalism’ during the Second Industrial Revolution. In a similar manner here, the general 
correlation and rough logic of a correspondence between human development and overall 
economic success gives some reassurance that a focus on human values is viable as an aspect 
of an economic strategy. But GDP and GDP growth (‘economic growth’) will prove problematic 
 
20 The emphasis on programmes for early childhood intervention associated with Nobel Prize-winning 
economist James Heckman have suggested that such programmes are a successful and efficient method of 
boosting economic growth (Dickens et al. 2006, Cunha and Heckman 2008, Chetty et al. 2011). 
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as guideposts to the fulfilment of a progressive agenda, and the viability of a socialist 
programme does not ensure that it will be implemented. 
 
In fact, as Sam Gindin suggests in a personal letter to one of us (Auerbach), US capitalism 
could continue on a strategy successfully executed in the 1990s that ‘depends on a brain drain 
from abroad plus a core of strong domestic universities to give it enough of the workers it 
needs. The rest of the population doesn't need a good education for the work they do 
servicing the rich and also other workers’ (see also Panitch and Gindin, 2012). This strategy 
may face long-run limitations; the strength embodied in US universities in the present is the 
result of an ‘organic’, domestic elevation of the quality of human assets that had taken place 
in the past, and brain-drain resources from abroad may eventually dissipate. But the Roman 
Army persisted for hundreds of years, all the while progressively deviating from the 
recruitment of soldiers of Roman and Italian ethnicity. A successful capitalism (i.e. measured 
by rates of growth in GDP) might long predominate without in any way converging with 
progressive, socialist principles.  
 
We are encouraged, however, by some recent developments. US policy debates have shifted 
dramatically as evidenced by proposed infrastructure bills that include a significant expansion 
of the social welfare system, one that is not out of line with what has been achieved in many 
European countries but unprecedented in the US. It should be noted also that our analysis in 
this paper has affinities with other recent interventions. The excellent and comprehensive 
socialist programme to be found in Piketty (2020 chapter 17), for instance, covers aspects of 
worker control of enterprises, progressive taxes on wealth and income, expansion of social 
welfare provision and expansion of access to, especially higher education.21 Perhaps the main 
difference is our emphasis on the crucial importance of early childhood. Education and other 
policies that affect early childhood development should not be seen as just another aspect of 
social welfare (Piketty, 2020, p.981). Without a strong focus on this critical stage in human 
development, programmes designed to generate true democratic rule and to break down 
class hierarchies may be bound for a failure that will, in the end, reinforce foolish and 
malicious discourse surrounding intrinsic ‘ability’ and I.Q. In the absence of a socialist 
 
21 The affinity may be even greater with Dragsted’s (2021) visions of ‘Nordic socialism’. 
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programme with central focus on the reality that the trajectory of skills, behaviour and 
attitudes likely to be possessed by individuals are well established by the age of seven or 
eight, existing class hierarchies will largely reproduce themselves.  
 
Appendix A 
The prototype model of wage-led growth considers a closed economy without public sector. 
Both the accumulation rate I/K and the ratio of saving to capital S/K are determined by the 
same two variables, the output capital ratio 𝑢𝑢 (the utilisation rate) and the profit share 𝜋𝜋: 
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
= 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢,𝜋𝜋);     𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢 > 0,𝑓𝑓𝜋𝜋 ≥ 0 
𝑆𝑆
𝐾𝐾
= 𝑔𝑔(𝑢𝑢,𝜋𝜋);     𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢 > 0,𝑔𝑔𝜋𝜋 ≥ 0 
The profit share is taken as exogenous, and if 𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢 ≠ 𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢 the equilibrium condition for the goods 
market (I/K=S/K) defines the utilisation rate as an implicit function of the profit share, 




The equilibrium solution for 𝑢𝑢 can be plugged into the investment (or saving) function to get 
the equilibrium rate of growth 
𝑌𝑌� = 𝐾𝐾� =  
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
− 𝛿𝛿 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋),𝜋𝜋) 
The economy is wage-led in this model if 𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢′ + 𝑓𝑓𝜋𝜋 < 0. 
 
Despite minor differences, the seminal contributions by Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984) and 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) all fit this general framework. The Rowthorn and Dutt 
specifications, which are nonlinear in 𝑢𝑢 and 𝜋𝜋, imply that the economy will be wage led as 
long as the Keynesian stability condition is satisfied (𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢 > 𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢); the Bhaduri-Marglin 
specification permits profit led outcomes even if the stability condition is satisfied. 
 
Wage-ledness (profit-ledness) has been seen as a strong argument for redistribution in favor 
of wages (profits). If a public sector is included, however, the equilibrium condition for the 














Private saving, moreover, will be affected by taxation. Consumption will now depend on 
disposable income, and one would also expect consumption to be influenced by wealth, that 
is, 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑊𝑊,Π, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐵𝐵) where 𝑊𝑊,𝛱𝛱, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋 and 𝐵𝐵 denote wages, profits, the tax rates 
on wages and profits, and public debt, and where the consumption function 𝐻𝐻 is linearly 
homogeneous in wages, profits and wealth. Formally, let 
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
= 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢,𝜋𝜋);     𝑓𝑓1 > 0, 𝑓𝑓2 ≥ 0 
𝑆𝑆
𝐾𝐾
= 𝑔𝑔(𝑢𝑢,𝜋𝜋, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋);    𝑔𝑔1 > 0,𝑔𝑔2 > 0,𝑔𝑔3 > 0,𝑔𝑔4 < 0,𝑔𝑔5 < 0 
where 𝑏𝑏 denotes the ratio of public debt to the capital stock. Tax revenues are given by 
𝑇𝑇
𝐾𝐾
= [𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝜋𝜋) + 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋]𝑢𝑢 
If 𝛾𝛾 = 𝐺𝐺/𝐾𝐾 and the tax parameters 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋 are policy instruments set by the fiscal authorities, 
the equilibrium condition now determines the utilisation rate as an implicit function of 
𝜋𝜋, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋,𝛾𝛾 and 𝑏𝑏: 
𝑢𝑢 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋, 𝛾𝛾, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋, 𝑏𝑏);   𝑢𝑢2 > 0,𝑢𝑢3 < 0,𝑢𝑢4 < 0,𝑢𝑢5 > 0 
The partial derivative with respect to 𝜋𝜋 cannot be signed without restrictions on the 
accumulation and saving functions. An expansion of government consumption and an 
increase in public debt, however, raise aggregate demand, and the utilisation rate 
unambiguously increases if the Keynesian stability condition is satisfied; analogously, an 
increase in the tax rates reduces utilisation. The (gross) accumulation rate can be found by 
substituting the solution for 𝑢𝑢 into the investment function, 
𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿 =
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
= 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋, 𝛾𝛾, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋, 𝑏𝑏),𝜋𝜋) = 𝐹𝐹(𝜋𝜋, 𝛾𝛾, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋, 𝑏𝑏);     𝐹𝐹2 > 0,𝐹𝐹3 < 0,𝐹𝐹4 < 0,𝐹𝐹5 > 0 
If the sign of the partial derivative 𝐹𝐹1 were to be positive -- signifying a profit-led economy -- 
the negative aggregate-demand effect of an egalitarian policy to raise the wage share can be 
offset by higher government consumption, lower taxes or higher government debt. There is 
no reason why aggregate demand effects should dictate distributional priorities. 
 
The model can be extended by adding Harrodian dynamics to the investment function and/or 
feedback effects from the labour market (the employment rate) to investment, saving and 
taxes. These extensions would not the affect the central point: economic policy can be used 
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